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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Globalization has proceeded at an unprecedented pace in the late 20th and 21st
centuries. One of the most dramatic changes with respect to the global economy is the
development of international economic law. The advent of an international economic
order has fundamentally changed the nature of the global economy, affecting countries as
well as the firms and individuals in every nation and region. In particular, the creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), which succeeded the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, heralded the start of international economic law.
International economic law, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, and the
associated rules that implement the WTO agreement together comprise a new regime of
global economic regulation.
This newly instated legal and regulatory framework raises many questions and has
already caused much uncertainty, especially with respect to one of its provisions, traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS). The effects of this new regime
deserve some investigation, particularly TRIPS and their effects on technology
dissemination. The distribution of technology is essential to the process of economic
growth and has several implications for economic development.
This paper will first provide an overview of the new international regime with the
advent of TRIPS. Second, most of the limited literature on TRIPS focuses on the best
response of nations under such a trading regime 1 and potential welfare losses from a set
of global intellectual property rights (IPRs) regulations. 2 We diverge from this approach
and consider the effects of such a regulatory regime on the costs of technology transfers
and thus innovation, notably from developed to developing countries. The results will
help inform the effects of an economic regulatory regime on innovation and economic
growth. Namely, we will argue that the costs imposed by TRIPS on the technology
transfer process will increase the cost of technology transfers and reduce the prospect of
rapid “catch up” growth. There is a countervailing effect in that a global rules-based
system may generate more FDI flows. The net effect is an empirical question, which we
assess in our conclusion that examines the likely implications for long-term economic
growth for developing countries.

*

University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom. Telephone: +44 (0)1865 279000, Fax:
+44 (0)1865 279090, E-mail: linda.yueh@economics.ox.ac.uk.
1
See, e.g., Gene Grossman & Edwin Lai, International Protection of Intellectual Property, 94 AMER.
ECON. REV. 1635 (2004).
2
See, e.g., Alan Deardoff, Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection, 59 ECONOMICA 35 (1992).
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Section II provides an introduction to the framework of global intellectual property
rights under the TRIPS provisions. Section III presents the linkages between global
intellectual property rights and economic growth. Section IV gives the theory behind
growth, technology, and the process of convergence, as well as a discussion of the
importance of laws and institutions. Section V presents the evidence concerning growth
and inequality in the global economy. The final section concludes.
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC REGULATION

¶5

The primary set of institutions related to the United Nations that constitute the
international economic order includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and most recently the WTO.
International trade had been previously regulated under a set of multilateral treaty
agreements governed by GATT, although GATT did not have legal standing under public
international law.
A. International Economic Law and the WTO

¶6

¶7

It is often surprising to learn that international economic law largely came into
existence around a decade ago, although previous laws had economic content.3 The
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (WTO Agreements) signed in Marrakesh,
Morocco on April 15, 1994, superseded GATT, which was set up in the aftermath of the
Second World War. The Uruguay Round of 1986-1994 created the WTO as the
international institution responsible for governing trade relationships. 4 The WTO came
into effect on January 1, 1995, and in turn established international economic law, the
public legal regime of trade rules among nations who are members of the WTO. As of
2007, 150 countries are members of the WTO and together they account for 95% of
world trade. The current round of negotiations in the WTO to extend its mandate is
known the Doha Round, initiated in Doha, Qatar in 2001, and is known informally as the
Development Round due to its emphasis on furthering the interests of developing
countries, though the extent of its success in doing so is yet to be determined.
Part of the WTO Agreements is a provision governing IPRs which has
fundamentally altered the basis of public international law as it pertains to economic
relationships. The following section discusses the evolution of the legal doctrine
concerning international IPRs.
B. Legal Doctrine Governing Intellectual Property Rights: TRIPS

¶8

The Paris and Berne Conventions of 1867 and 1871 provided a legal framework for
IPRs in the international arena that lasted for more than a century. These embodied the
two major doctrines relating to IPRs under public international law. The first is
territoriality, stating that property rights are to be honoured by each state’s rules. The
second is the doctrine of independence, which states that the grant of property rights

3

Andrew Lowenfeld, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2003).
The WTO agreements are also termed the Final Act of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations.
4

437

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2007

within one country does not have force in another. However, after World War II, an
increasing concern of the balance between the innovator and the benefits of diffusing
knowledge, particularly to developing countries, challenged the existing legal norm. The
needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed countries (LDCs), for
technology and industrialization seemed to justify a reduction of benefits to innovators by
the LDCs’ governments. Two typical examples of limitations imposed on innovators
included: (1) a patent could only be granted if the intellectual property was worked and
exploited within the boundary of a country (a working requirement) and (2) the terms and
royalties for licenses of intellectual property could be determined by the government in
the absence of agreement by the innovator (compulsory licensing).
¶9
The two doctrines were rendered irrelevant with the advent of international
economic law. International economic law is premised instead on the norm that the
harmony or uniformity of laws is the ideal for the free flow of goods and services
globally. Since 1995, the LDCs have been compelled to eventually adopt TRIPS, which
are closer to U.S. standards of protection. This framework reinforces the view that the
justification for granting IPRs is to present to the innovator some monopolistic return
from an investment that will benefit society and which would otherwise not occur, with
some provisions allowing for the issues of concern to developing countries.
¶10
The WTO, in short, will enforce a set of internationally recognised standards for
intellectual property into national laws, while providing both a dispute settlement
mechanism, the Dispute Settlement Understanding under the WTO (DSU) and
consultation process, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), to resolve disputes among
nations over these international norms. A one-year transition period for developed
countries to bring their legislation and practices into conformity with the TRIPS
Agreement was provided. In contrast, developing countries and countries in the process
of transition from a centrally planned into a market economy have a five-year period and
LDCs, 11 years, which has since been extended. Developing countries that do not have
product patent protection in an area of technology would have up to ten years to
introduce such protection. 5 Within the next few decades, every member should have
adopted the guidelines of TRIPS.
¶11
However, difficult problems remain, particularly in terms of implementation for
developing countries. Common features of LDCs’ legal systems are that IPRs are subject
to inconsistent coverage, uncertain terms of protection, arbitrary transferability, and
inadequate enforcement. Early evidence shows that the developed nations use the dispute
settlement mechanism more often than developing countries and always against
developing countries. 6
¶12
In terms of TRIPS, as of April 2007, 24 cases were brought before the DSU
regarding TRIPS and another four related to TRIPS enforcement, accounting for around
5
The exception is with respect to pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products. They must accept
the filing of patent applications from the beginning of the transitional period. The novelty of the invention
is preserved as of the date of filing the application. If authorization for the marketing of the relevant
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical is obtained during the transitional period, the developing country
concerned must offer an exclusive marketing right for the product for five years, or until a product patent is
granted, whichever is shorter. This has been further modified in the current round of WTO negotiations,
the Doha Round, concerning the dissemination of drugs to combat the HIV virus.
6
See Matthijs Geuze & Hannu Wager, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the TRIPS
Agreement, 2 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 347 (1999) for the statistics of DSU invocation.
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7.8% of all cases. Every case was brought by the U.S., E.U. and member states, or
Canada, except for one by Brazil. Nineteen of these were instituted by the U.S., plus all
four of the TRIPS enforcement cases.
C. The Relevant Provisions of TRIPS
¶13

We turn to the main provisions of TRIPS and assess whether the present structure
achieves its intentions regarding promoting innovation. In Part I of TRIPS, Articles 3
and 4 set up the principle of the harmonisation of laws. Article 3 provides for National
Treatment. This means that domestic and foreign firms must be given the same treatment
by a government, which accords with general WTO principles. Article 4 gives Most
Favoured Nation treatment, which stipulates that any advantage given to one firm must
be given to all other firms, which is again consistent with WTO aims.
¶14
Part II of the agreements specifies the standards concerning the availability, scope,
and use of intellectual property rights. First, Articles 9 through 21 govern copyrights,
trademarks, and industrial designs, and we focus on some notable provisions. Article 9
articulates the standard for copyright protection, extended to “expressions and not to
ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.” This is a
formulation in line with the U.S. standard for copyright protection. 7 Article 10 provides
that computer programs will be treated as literary works, including compilation of data or
other materials, while the actual data or material is not encompassed. Article 12 provides
that copyright protection extends for 50 years from publication (other than a photographic
work or a work of applied art). This again reflects the standard of the U.S. Article 18
provides for trademark protection that is initially for seven years from registration and is
renewable indefinitely. Compulsory licensing of trademarks is not permitted, according
to Article 21. Finally, industrial design protection will last for at least 10 years.
¶15
Section 5 addresses the important issue of patents. Patents shall be “available for
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that
they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application” in
Article 27. Footnote 5 to Article 27 indicates that the terms “inventive step” and
“capable of industrial application” may be deemed to be synonymous with “non-obvious”
and “useful” respectively.
Patent rights are further to be enjoyable “without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products
are imported or locally produced.” This provision prevents parallel imports. 8 Article 28
provides that exclusive rights are conferred as follows on products and processes,
respectively: (1) a patent holder can prevent third parties from making, using, offering for
sale, selling, or importing a product and (2) a patent holder can prevent the same action
for any products obtained from the process. Patent owners have the right to assign, or
transfer by succession the patent and to conclude licensing contracts. A condition for the
7

See The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101.
Exhaustion of IPRs refers to the extent to which IPR holders can control the distribution of their
protected goods. Once IPR holders sell a protected product in a jurisdiction, they must permit the resale of
that product in that place because the IPR has been “exhausted” by the first sale. Parallel imports refer to
the goods that were bought and then resold in a jurisdiction other than where the original product was sold
or exhausted. Parallel importers are those firms or individuals that purchase an item that has exhausted its
IPRs in one jurisdiction and then sell that item in another jurisdiction. There are three types of exhaustion
regimes in the world: national, regional and international.
8
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grant includes Member countries demanding an applicant for a patent disclose
corresponding foreign applications and grants.
Article 31 allows Member countries to use the subject matter of a patent without
the authorization of the right holder, subject to specific provisions. These include use
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market and that the right holder shall be
paid adequate remuneration. This latter provision of “compulsory licensing” reflects the
use permitted to LDCs subject to a “working requirement,” stated earlier in the article.
The term of protection extended to patents is no less than 20 years counted from the
filing date, according to Article 33. Interestingly, U.S. law provides for protection of 17
years and this is thought to bring the U.S. in line with the rest of the industrialised
countries, such as the UK which provides up to 20 years. Another difference is whether
the basis of the grant is to the “first to invent” or “first to file.” The U.S. is perhaps the
only country which grants patents on the basis of the first to invent the subject matter.
The first to file standard is the predominant one. Member countries which do not have a
system of original grant are to compute the period from the filing date in the system of
original grant.
The prominent recent issue on this score has been pharmaceutical companies which
produce drugs to treat HIV. Their prices are unaffordable for many developing countries,
but under the current framework, the firms can refuse to permit generic versions of the
drugs to be made by LDCs. Pharmaceutical companies fear that these generic versions
will find their way out of the LDCs and into their overseas markets, eroding their profits
and reducing their incentive to innovate. As part of the Doha Round negotiations, the
TRIPS declaration calls for flexibility to allow LDCs to decide on the extent of
intellectual property protection in the face of public health crises which can constitute
national emergencies. 9
Finally, Article 40 deals with the control of anticompetitive practices in contractual
licenses. Member countries are permitted to specify in their domestic legislation those
practices which restrain competition and adversely affect trade or impede the transfer and
dissemination of technology. Consistent with the TRIPS Agreement, Member countries
must enter into consultations with any other Member country to which the IPR owner is a
national or domiciliary.
The remaining articles address enforcement and details of the DSU. Damages and
injunctions are possible remedies in a domestic economy. When disputes among nations
cannot be resolved, the DSU is invoked. It is important to note that parties to the DSU
are countries and not individuals or firms. However, the actions undertaken by a
government on behalf of a firm conform to an agency framework where political
influence and perceived national interests tend to coincide.
Therefore, the TRIPS provision provides for IPRs protection in all member
countries on a fairly uniform basis with many aspects mirroring the U.S. IPRs system.
The intent is to reduce the risk of expropriation and therefore promote innovation. The
protection accorded to IPRs though, is of monopoly pricing that will increase the costs of
any use of such technology, such as when transferred to a developing country, which no
9

The language of the provisos includes: “Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health
crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”
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longer has the option of instigating their own terms. Although implementation has been
delayed for many developing countries as well as exemptions provided for
pharmaceuticals, the growth implications of the eventual adoption of TRIPS warrant
consideration.
III. THE EFFECTS OF TRIPS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
¶22

The effect of TRIPS on technology diffusion holds significant implications for
economic growth. The justification for IPRs generally relates to the need to protect the
incentive to innovate weighed against the social cost of allowing monopoly profits to
accrue and the loss to society of not having free access to the protected goods. Nordhaus,
for instance, finds that the optimal patent policy equates the dynamic marginal benefit
with the static marginal efficiency loss. 10 Landes and Posner make similar arguments
regarding the scope of protection, which they posit should be narrow in order to lower the
cost of innovation. 11 In the simplest case, the appropriate period of protection is that
which allows the innovator to cover the risk-adjusted cost of innovative activity. 12 The
breadth or scope of such protection will depend on the nature of the market. 13
¶23
In a closed economy in which this framework is largely based, Arrow showed that
the design of IPRs protection poses a trade-off to a welfare-maximising government. 14
However, in an open economy, Grossman and Lai argue that the trade-offs are less
clear. 15 Countries do not reap all the global benefits that come from protecting IPRs
within their borders and they will differ in their capacities for innovation due to
differences in skill endowments and technical knowledge. Further, domestic and foreign
firms are likely to have different abilities to innovate. In the context of two trading
countries, an efficient patent regime would equalise the marginal deadweight loss in the
two countries. They further show that harmonisation of patent protection does not meet
this need as this is achieved in their model through one country lengthening its patent
protection period.
¶24
Preceding TRIPS, technology transfer agreements were included as annexes to
domestic-foreign joint venture agreements. Such agreements provided for the transfer of
know-how in manufacturing to managerial practices. These explicit transfers were
negotiated in addition to implicit transfers that occurred simply through the introduction
of foreign personnel and techniques. This type of transfer had the effect of shifting the
productive frontier of an economy and improving short-term economic performance.
Any resultant technological progress would be crucial to the long-run growth process.

10
William Nordhaus, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969).
11
William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325
(1989).
12
Stanley Besen & Leo Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5
J. ECON. PERSP. 5 (1991).
13
See Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113
(1990).
14
Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS (1962).
15
Gene Grossman & Edwin Lai, International Protection of Intellectual Property, 94 AMER. ECON.
REV. 1635 (2004).
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For developing countries in particular, technology diffusion provides what is
termed in the literature as the possibility of “catching up.” By adopting the technology of
more developed nations, developing countries are able to reduce the cost of innovation
and introduce productivity advances into their own economies. Through this process,
especially when starting at low levels, developing countries are thought to be able to
achieve growth at high rates and thus “catch up” to developed ones.
¶26
Since the promulgation of TRIPS, it remains to be understood how the balance
between innovating companies and the need for technology diffusion is struck. In terms
of optimal mechanism design, a regime which provides for technology diffusion with
positive cost will necessarily result in lower levels of efficiency. The question for further
consideration is whether the benefits from innovation are evident, particularly with
respect to developing countries, which may or may not be expected to move toward
global convergence in their growth rates.
IV. A LAW AND ECONOMICS VIEW OF CONVERGENCE
¶27

Neoclassical models of long-run economic growth are premised on a number of
assumptions, which essentially presume that there are no frictions or institutional barriers
in markets. The Solow model, for instance, considers economic growth where there are
no barriers to the movement of capital, no impediments in capital markets so that interest
rates reflect the internal rate of return to capital, technology is costlessly shared, and there
is no movement of people or natural resources, the latter of which is not typically
modeled. It is well known that the Solow model does not explain growth well, and that
one of the main predictions of the model has not held up when viewed in the growth
experience of countries in the post-war period. Namely, the lack of convergence in
growth rates of per capita GDP around the world. 16
¶28
However, the neoclassical framework remains useful, particularly the variants in
which technology is modeled and human capital is introduced. New growth theory,
especially endogenous growth theory, provides a more complex view of growth, which
are richer but also seems not to explain well the main drivers of economic growth. 17
¶29
Starting with the neoclassical view, economies will reach a steady state level of
growth. 18 The two functions which drive this result are the production function and the
investment function of the economy. Cross-border aspects are introduced in the Solow
model as an extension of the concept of diminishing returns to capital and the free flow of
capital and technology. In a Cobb-Douglas production function of the economy,
1−α
Y = F (K , AL ) = K α ( AL ) , where Y is output, K is capital, L is labour and A is
technology, there are constant returns to scale but diminishing returns to a factor, such as
capital. 19

16
William Baumol, Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: What the Long-run Data Show,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 1072 (1986); J. Bradford DeLong, Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare:
Comment, 78 AMER. ECON. REV. 1138 (1988).
17
Jonathan Temple, The New Growth Evidence, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 112 (1999).
18
Charles Jones, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH (2nd ed. 2001).
19
The technology variable is viewed as “labour-augmenting” in this formulation. Alternatively, it could
take the form of “capital-augmenting” or Y = F ( AK , L ). In a Cobb-Douglas form for the production
function where there is zero cross-price elasticity, the distinction is not significant.
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Economies with high levels of capital stock will encounter fewer and fewer returns
to capital investment. In contrast, developing countries which have lower levels of
capital stock will allow capital to reap a higher return. This well-known mechanism will
generate convergence in growth rates as capital moves from countries with lower to ones
with higher returns. This theory of “catch up” growth, however, has not borne out
completely. For one, if capital can move freely, then there should be no correlation
between national savings and national investment. The Feldstein-Horioka paradox,
however, finds a positive correlation. 20 The movement of capital is apparently driven by
a range of factors not just related to a simple view of returns, but is also dependent on
risk and domestic infrastructure, among many others. 21
The high transaction costs in capital markets in developing countries and the lack
of well defined property rights, because institutional foundations are not established, will
reduce the flow of capital that is critical in generating growth. In other words,
developing countries are poorer than developed ones, which implies a lower level of
national savings. This is due to the poor having a lower marginal propensity to save
because more of their income is consumed, as well as having to cope with imperfect
credit markets which often exist in developing countries that make it more difficult to
channel what savings there is into funds for investment.
The level of growth in the Solow model is dependent on an investment function
that reflects the amount of savings in the economy. 22 The lower marginal propensity to
save of poorer and primarily agricultural households in developing countries will lead
these economies to have a lower steady state. Two countries, A and B, with different
rates of saving, will have different steady state levels of output. Therefore, country A,
with a higher level of savings and investment, will also have a higher steady state level of
output than country B. This will mean a lower level of per capita GDP for country B
unless it has access to foreign capital, which can bolster the level of domestic savings and
therefore raise the steady state.
Where there is technological progress, there is a positive rate of growth. Following
an improvement in technology, the economy grows and reaches a new steady state.
However, technology in this model is exogenous. It is an important assumption of the
model, but one that has been viewed as akin to “manna from heaven.” Somehow
technology comes into the economy from the outside regardless of what is happening
within the economy.
Endogenous growth models modify the neoclassical framework by introducing a
production function for ideas. The reason is because one of the exogenous components
in the neoclassical models is the driver of the rate of economic growth, i.e., technological
progress. The Romer model, which introduces the production of ideas, attempts to
explain differential growth rates among countries by exploring the differences among
countries in the amount of skilled workers who can innovate and create technological
progress. Therefore, technological progress is determined within the model.

20

Martin Feldstein & Charles Horioka, National Saving and International Capital Flows, 90 ECON. J.
314 (1980).
21
Giorgio Navaretti & Anthony Venables, MULTINATIONAL FIRMS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2006).
22
See, e.g., Robert Lucas, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3
(1989).
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This raises further questions in terms of laws and institutions. One of the main
impediments to innovation is the nature of ideas. 23 Because ideas are essentially like
public goods where many can benefit from one idea, there is a risk of expropriation.
Since the protection of ideas is incomplete, this can deter investment in innovation. On
the other hand, because ideas have wider benefits than just to the innovator, there is a
social cost to restricting the dissemination of ideas or imposing a cost on them. Thus,
innovation is encouraged through protection of IPRs, which reduces the risks of
expropriation, but creates an artificial monopoly for a time which increases the cost of
using that technology. Other methods involve fiscal incentives and public investment.
For instance, the government could offer tax credits to entrepreneurs or give concessions
to businesses as well as invest in R&D itself. It is perhaps the IPRs issue which is most
relevant to considering the law and economics aspects of growth.
¶36
Both the neoclassical framework and the Romer model of endogenous growth
would be affected by the legal framework. The norms surrounding IPRs internationally
had differed among countries because the overriding principle was respect for
sovereignty. This has changed with the TRIPS agreement. By protecting the innovation
globally, it may increase the number of researchers who innovate, as in the Romer model.
By doing so, it also increases the cost of acquiring technology relevant to the Solow
model, as developing countries cannot simply imitate existing technology in order to
catch up in terms of its growth rate. Even before the TRIPS agreement, multinational
corporations often received value for any explicit technology transfers that accompanied
foreign direct investment. This could provide a further explanation for the lack of
convergence in growth rates, since costly transfer would hamper the catching-up process
as envisioned by the Solow model, and is in addition to the explanations posited by those
seeking to explain the Feldstein-Horioka paradox.
¶37
Moreover, if we moved toward a law and economics framework for growth, we
would consider the legal rules that govern property rights, the institutional factors that
influence the movement of broad concepts of capital (human, physical, and social), and
the multi-faceted economic and legal determinants of technological progress, which are
key to understanding growth rates. What evidence has been found has been in respect of
conditional convergence, and countries are found to converge to their own steady states
determined by a number of factors, including being a leader in technological
innovation. 24 The legal and institutional considerations of each country, therefore, can
influence the steady state level of growth through its shaping of the factors relevant to
growth. And importantly, the formal institutions have and will certainly continue to
affect the rate of technological progress that drives differential growth rates. By
analysing the effects of TRIPS, we are proposing an additional factor in this type of
framework that could shed light on the drivers of divergent growth rates.

23
Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS, (1962).
24
Robert Barro & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Technological Diffusion, Convergence, and Growth, 2 J. ECON.
GROWTH 1 (1997).
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V. EVIDENCE OF GROWTH AND INEQUALITY
¶38

Even before the TRIPS agreement, it was common for countries to have costly
transfers of technology and practices varied. From the multinational corporation’s
perspective, it would charge for the use of proprietary knowledge where possible.
Technology was simply not costlessly shared, except perhaps through imitation and
where compulsory licensing was used, which lowered the costs. Thus, it is possible to
predict a lack of convergence due in part to the IPRs system, as seen in Figure 1.
¶39
Figure 1 gives the growth rates of the world’s economies plotted against their initial
levels of income before TRIPS. If there is evidence of convergence, then there should be
an inverse correlation between the rate of growth and the initial level of income. This is
not seen in the figure which examines, for a large sample of economies, initial GDP per
capita in 1960 and growth rates from 1960 to 1995, the year of the adoption of the TRIPS
agreement.
Figure 1. Growth rate and initial per capita GDP, 1960-1995 25
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¶40

It is too soon to examine the evidence of convergence since the advent of the
TRIPS agreement as many developing countries have not yet adopted its provisions.
Under the TRIPS regime, there would be a more consistent monopoly price for utilising
technologies and penalties would be in place for infringement, adding further to the cost,
including for imitation. Whether this will be outweighed by the transfer of more
25
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sophisticated technologies or more foreign direct investment (FDI) that could embody
technology and knowledge as investors feel more confident under the TRIPS regime or
induce more innovation in the developing countries themselves, is an empirical question.
Figure 2: Global FDI Flows, 1990-2004 26
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Figure 2 shows the proportion of FDI to in developing countries relative to the
global flows. From 1990 to 2004, developing countries received an average of 28% of
global FDI flows. This is concentrated in specific regions. The main recipients,
moreover, are still the developed countries and select developing countries such as China
(see Table 1 below).
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Figure 3: FDI Flows to Developing Countries by Region, 1990-2004 27
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There is evidence that growing amounts of capital flow from developed to
developing countries, albeit still less than the predictions of the neoclassical model and
biased toward some regions as seen in Figures 2 and 3. Nevertheless, the upward trend in
FDI in the past decade is clear. In Table 1, it also appears that developing countries are
gaining an increasing share of global capital flows, particularly the period since 1996.
Since most FDI comes from developed countries as seen in Table 2, it is likely to embody
technology. However, as the article has posited, and consistent with the general findings
regarding FDI, capital flows alone are insufficient to ensure technology absorption by
developing countries. By contrast, where technology is transferred, the costliness of it
stands at odds with the presumption of free transfers in growth models; therefore, the
implication is of slower convergence than predicted.
Table 1: Main Recipients of FDI in 1991-2004, $ bn 28
1991-96

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

World

254

482

686

1079

1393

824

652

617

730

Developed Economies

156

270

472

825

1121

589

548

442

380

EU

88

128

250

476

684

389

420

339

216

USA

49

103

174

283

314

144

71

57

96

92

193

191

230

246

209

156

166

233

25

44

44

40

41

47

53

54

61

Developing Economies
China
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Table 2: Major Sources of FDI Outflow, 1991-2004, $ bn 29
1991-96

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

World

280

477

683

1096

1200

711

652

617

730

Developed Economies

240

396

631

1021

1098

660

600

577

637

67

96

131

209

143

104

135

119

229

Western Europe

140

244

415

724

806

429

397

390

309

Developing Countries

39

77

50

73

99

47

48

29

83

1

1

3

2

2

-2

2

0

9

17

24

17

19

59

11

17

5

40

1

3

1

2

3

3

4

10

10

US

Brazil
Hong Kong
Russia
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The rapid increase in globalisation and the WTO have perhaps facilitated global
trade and capital flows in a rules-based system. The evidence of increasing integration of
the global economy highlights the trade off between a uniform international system of
laws and rules that could increase investor confidence, while also making the cost of
technology diffusion more costly for developing countries. The rules-based system holds
significant promise in governing economic growth, particularly in international trade and
facilitating global investment, but the TRIPS provision could contribute to the inability of
developing countries to “catch up.”
VI. CONCLUSION

¶44

In this paper, the main parts of the new global regime as it pertains to intellectual
property have been explored as well as the implications for economic growth.
Considering the TRIPS provisions and how the resultant harmonisation of laws is likely
to affect technology transfers followed. This is then assessed in terms of global growth
rates in the post World War II period.
¶45
Although it is too early to examine the evidence concerning convergence since the
advent of TRIPS, it is fairly evident that the new regime will impose monopoly prices on
technology transfers that are the engine of “catch up” growth. However, the increase in
globalisation based on a rules-based system may induce greater foreign investment in
developing countries, though the capital still tends to flow to Asia and successful
emerging markets, such as China, suggesting that other factors are at play.
¶46
The TRIPS Agreement under international economic law introduced provisions that
restrict technology transfers in cross-border transactions. Although the trade provisions
are considered as predominate, TRIPS may prove to be the most significant provision
concerning economic development derived from international economic law. The
diffusion of technology thought to be necessary for economic growth has come up
against the legal foundation of IPRs in a new global system that has been otherwise
beneficial in providing a rules-based regime supporting globalisation.
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